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The "Like Grade and Quality" Clause of
the Robinson-Patman Act: A Construction
To Effect the Objectives of the Act
Recent judicial and Federal Trade Commission decisions
have raised important questions concerning the construc-
tion of the "like grade and quality" clause of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. The author of this Note analyzes some
of these questions in the light of both economic and legal
considerations. He concludes that the clause ought not
be construed to preclude application of the act to com-
modities which are mutually competitive even though
consumers prefer one over the other because of physical
or brand distinctions.
INTRODUCTION
Viable competition may exist among products which, although
adapted to similar purposes, are differentiated in the minds of
consumers, who consequently will pay different prices for them.-
Such product differentiation may be based upon actual differ-
ences in the physical characteristics or quality of the products,
or upon subjective evaluations made by consumers? Since such
differentiation results in preferences for certain products mani-
fested by the willingness of buyers to pay "premium" prices for
them, a seller may find that the market within which he com-
petes will be larger or smaller depending upon the degree to which
consumer preferences are reflected in price differentials.3 Thus a
seller of low grade gasoline may find his product marketable only
at a price two or three cents below that of premium gasoline.
Similarly, a nonbranded product may be competitive with one
bearing the brand of a nationally known manufacturer only at
a significant discount, despite the fact that the two products are
physically identical. This competitive situation differs, therefore,
in two major respects from that illustrated by models of "pure"
competition in which all sellers deal in identical products4 and
1. See generally CAMERLIN, THE THEORY or MoNoPoLIsTIc CoMPETI-
TIoN (8th ed. 1962).
2. See id. at 56-57; ScITovsxy, WEAT E Aw COMPETITION 403-10 (1951).
3. See Adelnan, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HaMv.
L. REV. 1289, 1298-1300 (1948).
4. MAcHLuP, THE Econozmcs or SEIDERS' COMPETITION 119 (1952).
all buyers are rational and omniscient. First, products which are
not physically identical may nevertheless be competitive with
one another. Second, physically identical products may not be
equally acceptable to consumers, whose preferences will be re-
flected in the premium prices commanded by the favored products.
Within this economic framework, the Robinson-Patman Act'
operates to prohibit discriminatory pricing practices deemed to
be injurious to competition. The application of the act is ex-
pressly confined to discrimination by a seller in the sale of two
or more commodities of "like grade and quality." It is the purpose
of this Note to examine the present interpretation of the "like
grade and quality" requirement and to consider whether, in light
of the objectives of the act, this interpretation takes proper
account of the problems arising from competition among dif-
ferentiated products.
I. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said that "precision of expression
is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman
Act .. . ."' This seems a particularly appropriate characterization
of the "like grade and quality" clause. In view of the ambiguity
of its legislative history,7 the precise scope of the clause will neces-
sarily be a product of judicial creativity. It would seem, however,
that wise interpretation of "like grade and quality" would be
facilitated if undertaken with an eye to the act's economic goals.
The purpose of the act as stated in section 2(a) is to make it
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce "to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
5. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964):
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition ....
6. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953).
7. See Cassady & Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade
and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 80 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 241, 243 (1957). The only congressional comments
on the meaning of "like grade and quality" are to the effect that the act
should prevent the practice of spurious branding or designing of products.
80 CONG. REc. 8234-35 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Patman). See also
Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
74th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 10, pt. 2, at 421, 469 (1936).
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grade and quality."" The act reflects a determination by Congress
that price differentials among various purchasers which cannot
be explained in terms of cost or competition are probably caused
by concentrations of market power.'0 It further reflects a con-
gressional value judgment that such concentrations should not
be permitted to take advantage of their power by granting or
obtaining price concessions to the disadvantage of others."
The act has often been criticized for fostering price rigidity in
conflict with the purposes of the other antitrust laws.' 2 Some
commentators seem to take the position that the act is therefore
bad and should be narrowly construed wherever possible." The
merits of this controversy have been discussed elsewhere.' 4 How-
ever it is resolved, the courts are in the final analysis faced with
a congressional determination that discriminatory pricing prac-
tices are undesirable. To the extent, therefore, that "like grade
and quality" is defined so as to oust the act of jurisdiction over
discriminatory pricing practices which tend to injure compe-
tition, attainment of the congressional objective will be frus-
trated.
A. PImARY LiNE DIsCRIMINATION
Section 2(a) seeks to prohibit practices deemed injurious to
competition in either the primary or secondary line.'" Since the
8. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
9. The act excepts from its proscriptions differentials "which make only
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are . . . sold or delivered . . . ," 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1964), and those which result from good faith efforts to meet equally low
prices of competitors, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
10. See EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 8-12 (1959);
SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND EcoNomic ORGANIZATION 509 (2d ed.
1959).
11. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Coar. ANTITRuST REP. 155 (1955).
12. E.g., EDWARDs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 457. See generally SCHWARTZ,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 509-12.
13. See, e.g., RoWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PAT-
avaw AACT 555 (1962).
14. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 10, at 509-12.
15. The original price discrimination provision in the Clayton Act was
aimed at practices lessening competition in the primary line. ATT'Y GEN.
NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 155 (1955). It was not until 1929 that the
Supreme Court recognized its applicability in secondary line cases. Van
Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). But the Robinson-
Patman Act was intended as a weapon against secondary line discrimination,
as evidenced by its characterization as an "anti-chain store measure." See
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economic ramifications of primary line discrimination differ
substantially from those of secondary line price discrimination,
these phases of the problem should be considered separately. One
ground for violation of the act, price discrimination resulting in
competitive injury at the primary line, occurs when a seller
discriminates among different buyers in an attempt to enhance
his own market position vis-a-vis his competitors. Such discrimi-
nation is generally on a territorial basis and takes the form of
charging lower prices in areas where the seller faces greater
competition.' The evil in conduct of this type is that the seller
who operates in more than one market has an advantage over
the seller who competes with him in only the more competitive
one. The profits which he derives from higher noncompetitive
prices in the other market may give him a "war chest" which
enables him to absorb the losses of a price-cutting campaign
against his competitor or to finance advertising or promotional
measures which his competitor cannot match.'
To an economist price discrimination occurs whenever the
difference between the prices of two products does not accurately
reflect the difference between their costs of production.!" As
A'r'y GEN. NAT'L CoAMi. ANTITRUST REP. 155 (1955); WILcox, PUBLIC
PoLicls TowARD BusIEss 61 (1955); Murray & Fixler, Area Price Dis-
crimination* A Workable Concept of Injury to Competition, 23 U. PITT. L.
REV. 893, 899-904 (1962). However, it was also held applicable to primary
line cases in the landmark case of FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S.
536 (1960).
16. See, e.g., ibid.; Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 848 U.S. 115 (1954);
Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); Porto Rican
Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).
17. See EDWARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION - REQUISITES OF A GoVERN-
MENT POLICY 20 (1949). In regard to geographic price discrimination, the
Court stated in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., supra note 16, at 119:
"If this method of competition were approved, the pattern for growth of
monopoly would be simple. . . . The profits made in interstate activities
would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns." A thorough
analysis of the effects of selective price cutting by geographically diversified
sellers may be found in Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co., supra note 16. Professor Adelman argues that only where such "war
chest" tactics are employed should the Robinson-Patman Act be applied in
primary line cases. He distinguishes the situation where price discrimination
is accompanied by no "predatory" intent, and different prices are charged
because economic conditions differ from market to market. Adelman, Price
Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 222, 228-30 (1955).
18. PAPANDREou & WHEELER, COMPETITION AND ITS REGULATION 400
(1954).
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Professor Adelman has stated: "[S]ince price less cost equals
profit . .. price discrimination, in the economic sense, is rigor-
ously defined as a difference in the profit earned from one cus-
tomer as against another." 9 Thus similarity between the prod-
ucts involved is not a prerequisite of price discrimination in an
economic senseo In FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,? the Supreme
Court held that products need not be competitive with each
other at the resale level for discriminatory prices in their sale at
the primary level to violate section 2(a). While this decision in-
volved discrimination in price between buyers in markets which
were noncompetitive because territorially segregated, the prin-
ciple seems equally applicable as an economic matter to cases
of price discrimination between buyers of functionally segregated
products22 In either case the seller who operates in both markets
has an advantage over the seller who competes with him only
in the more competitive market. Moreover, a seller who markets
a physically identical product under his brand name at a pre-
mium price and without the brand name at a lower price is apt
to attain the same advantage relative to a seller who deals only
in the unbranded product provided that the promotion of the
branded product does not consume the entire price differential.
Thus, in furthering the economic objectives of section 2(a) with
respect to primary line competition, strict construction of the
"like grade and quality" clause is completely out of place?" A
possible explanation for the inclusion of this apparently irrele-
vant limitation upon application of the act to primary line dis-
crimination may lie in the fact that the act was drafted with
secondary line discrimination primarily in mind?' In any event,
19. Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's
Report, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 222, 223 (1955).
20. See PAPANDREOU & WHEELER, op. cit. supra note 18.
21. 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
S2. See EDwARDs, MAmNTANING COMPETITION-REQUISITES OF A GoVERN-
MNTAL PomcY 20 (1949). In fact discrimination involving totally different
products may pose an even greater threat than territorial discrimination.
The amount of discrimination possible on a territorial basis is limited to the
cost of transportation between the two markets, since goods can be purchased
in the lower-priced market and shipped to the other. See Leontief, Theory
of Limited and Unlimited Discrimination, 54 Q.J. of EcoNouncs, 490, 491
(1940).
23. In adopting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress rejected an alterna-
tive bill offered by the FTC which simply forbade a seller to "discriminate
unfairly or unjustly in price between different purchasers of commodities
. . . ." See FTC, FiNAL REPORT ON THE CHMN SToRE INVESTIGATION 96-97
(1934); Cassady & Grether, supra note 7, at 276.
24. See note 15 supra.
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consideration of the objectives of the act with respect to primary
line discrimination is of no value in construing "like grade and
quality."a
B. SECONDARY LINE DiscRniNATioN
When purchasers of a given product are in competition with
each other in its resale, the effect of a discrimination in the
prices charged them by the seller may be felt in the purchasers'
or secondary line of competition, since the purchaser paying the
higher price is at an obvious competitive disadvantage?" Price
discrimination of this type may be initiated by the seller in an
attempt to increase his sales through such means as quantity
discounts,27 or by a large, powerful buyer who is in a position to
demand price concessions? 8
While the economics of primary line price discrimination place
no limit on the construction of "like grade and quality," the same
cannot be said of secondary line price discrimination. The pur-
pose of the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to the secondary
line of competition is to assure that buyers who compete in the
resale of goods receive equal prices in the purchase of the goods
from a common seller. In FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,-" the Supreme
Court stated that it was obvious "that the competitive oppor-
tunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to
25. Professor Edwards suggests that in measuring "injury to competition"
when applying the Robinson-Patman Act, different standards should be
used in primary line cases and secondary line cases. EDwARDs, THE PRICE
DIscrmnNATIoN LAw 544 (1959). It might be argued that dual definitions
could also be employed in determining the existence of "like grade and
quality." Such an interpretation would probably violate congressional intent,
however, since the language of the act makes "like grade and quality" a
jurisdictional requirement without reference to the "injury" clause. Further,
if the "like grade and quality" concept were treated differently in primary
and secondary line cases so as to effect the economic purpose of the act as
applied to the case at issue, an impossible situation would arise for a seller
who must contend with both possible applications of the act. See text
paragraph accompanying note 62 infra.
26. A third aspect of price discrimination is that which affects the
tertiary line of competition, and occurs when price concessions are passed
on through an intermediate buyer and result in an unfair advantage for
customers of the favored buyer. Tertiary line discrimination is similar in
effect to secondary-line price discrimination. See RowE, op. cit. supra note
1, at 201; Murray & Fixier, supra note 15, at 897.
27. SciTovsKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 406-10 (1951).
28. E.g., the "chain" store. See note 15 upra; Note, 86 CoLum. L. REV.
1285 (1936).
29. 884 U.S. 87 (1948).
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pay ... substantially more for their goods than their competitors
had to pay."30 The economic significance of secondary line price
discrimination is that the operating margin or mark up of the
unfavored purchaser will be lower than that of his competitor.
Thus, if other factors are equal, his effectiveness as a competitive
factor in the market will be lessened.3' The importance of the
"margin" was stressed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
in Standard Motor Products, Inc.:2 "A more advantageous price
to one customer gives him increased margin of profit, permits
additional services to customers, more vigorous selling and other
opportunities for the extension of his business at the expense of
his less-favored competitors.""m Thus it may be seen that to
achieve the economic objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act
in regard to secondary line price discrimination, a standard
should be developed which will require pricing by the seller
such that each buyer's cost-price ratio will equal that of other
buyers with whom he is in competition. 4
II. CONSTRUCTION OF "LIKE GRADE AND QUALITY"
BY THE COURTS AND THE FTC
The basic issues presented in interpreting "like grade and
quality" as that term appears in section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act are (1) the extent to which physical identity be-
tween the commodities involved will be required and (2) the
extent, if any, that brand preferences will be taken into account,
resulting in the creation of one or more premium products out
of a group of products which are otherwise physically identical.
To date neither Robinson-Patman Act litigation nor antitrust
scholars have given a great deal of consideration to the interpre-
tation of "like grade and quality."33 However, an examination of
the available authority in the courts and the FTC does disclose
certain trends in the construction of the clause. 6
80. Id. at 46-47.
31. See EDWARDS, THE PmcE DIscRmIxATIoN LAw 224-25 (1959).
82. 54 F.T.C. 814 (1957).
38. Id. at 828.
34. Subject, of course, to statutory defenses of cost justification and
good faith meeting of competition. See note 9 supra.
35. Among the discussions of the problems presented by the clause are:
ATT'y GEN. NAT L Comr. ANTrruST REP. 156-59 (1955); Cassady &
Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the
Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. CAL. L. REV.
241 (1957); Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The
Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956).
36. Cases dealing with the issue of "like grade and quality" are also
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A. REQURElMENT OF PHYSICAL IDENTITY
Under section 2 of the "old" Clayton Act,' 7 the original price
discrimination law, the Eighth Circuit held that it was a defense
to a charge of price discrimination in the sale of gloves that the
gloves were made of different materials by labor of different
degrees of skill. 8 This physical comparison test was again em-
ployed under the Robinson-Patman Act in Atlanta Trading
Corp. v. FTC," where the Second Circuit held that differences
among various cuts of pork negated the existence of "like grade
and quality," and overruled the conclusion of the FTC that the
test of "like grade and quality" had been met because "ham is
ham."o The latest judicial pronouncement on the question oc-
curred in Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co.,41
where the court assumed without discussion that differences in
ingredients precluded a finding that various grades of ice
cream were of "like grade and quality." In none of these cases
did the court inquire into the extent to which the commodities
involved were in competition with each other. In Atlanta
Trading Corp. the question was dismissed by the court as being
of no significance.42 Thus it appears that the clause "like grade
and quality" has generally been construed to permit application
of the act only where the commodities in question are physically
identical."
In a few cases the strict requirement of physical identity has
collected in RoWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 62-76 (1962, Supp. 1964, at 9-11). The earlier cases may be found in
authorities cited note 35 supra.
37. 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Under the 1914 act, it was a defense to demon-
strate that price differentials were due to variations in "grade, quality or
quantity" between the products involved, while the 1936 act required a
showing of "like grade and quality" to establish a prima facie case of
violation. The provision relating to quantity differences was eliminated by
the Robinson-Patman amendment.
38. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934).
39. 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958). This case was brought under § 2(d)
which contains no "like grade and quality" clause, but requires the presence
of the same "products or commodities." The court treated the two standards
as if they were identical.
40. The Atlanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 568 (1956) (hearing
examiner's statement adopted by Commission).
41. 184 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 287 Red 265 (7th Cir. 1961).
42. See 258 F.2d at 370-71.
43. Another case involved the sale of a "combination" item at a price
less than the total of the prices at which individual parts could be bought
separately. The court held that the combination and parts were not of "like
grade and quality." Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972
1965] NOTE 118.3
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been relaxed. Where a seller markets a "line" of related products,
such as automobile parts, and discriminates in price through dis-
counts which apply to the entire line, the courts and the FTC
have not required the plaintiff to demonstrate that any particular
product withn the line has been sold at discriminatory prices
to establish the existence of "like grade and quality."4 And in
a case which seems to have attracted no support, American Can
Co. v. Bruce's Juices," the Fifth Circuit held that differences in
the height of cans sold to producers of fruit juice would not
negate a finding of "like grade and quality." Different considera-
tions would appear to have been involved in that case, however,
since the cans were not to be resold as end items, but were
integrated into commodities which themselves were highly com-
petitive and probably would have satisfied the requirement of
physical identity."
Two 1964 FTC decisions make it clear, however, that the
FTC still requires physical identity to find "like grade and
quality" in the usual case. In the first, Universal-Rundle Corp.,
the Commission for the first time expressly dealt with the
question whether section 2(a) could be applied to the discrimi-
natory sale of functionally interchangeable but physically dif-
ferent commodities.48 The respondent was a manufacturer of
plumbing fixtures. In addition to its regular "Universal-Rundle"
line, it produced a special "Homart" line which was sold to Sears
(2d Cir. 1944). See also Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 47 (1953),
where a complaint charging discrimination in price between buyers of spark
plugs which differed in their brand names and in their "insulators" and
"ribs" was dismissed for want of "like grade and quality." Rowe, supra note
85, at 13. But cf. a dictum in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812
(1962), indicating that if television programs were commodities within the
meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act, they may well be "of like grade and
quality" if they have "demonstrated comparable audience drawing power,"
notwithstanding their differences in format.
44. See, e.g., Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd,
355 U.S. 411 (1958); Dayco Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1963-1965
FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 17029 (Aug. 25, 1964); P & D
Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1155 (1956).
45. 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), pet. for rehearing denied, 190 F.2d 73 (5th
Cir.), cert. dismissed on petitioner's motion, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
46. See the opinion of the trial court, 87 F. Supp. 985, 987 (S.D. Fla.
1949).
47. TRAD, REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1963-1965 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 16948 (1964).
48. Previous cases in the FTC had not faced this question as a direct
issue. See Cassady & Grether, supra note 35, at 244 n.11.
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Roebuck. Items in the "Homart" line differed in physical charac-
teristics from those in the "Universal-Rundle" line and com-
manded a lower price at both the retail and wholesale levels.
Citing such variations as differences in the height and width of
bathtubs in the two lines, and the absence of a platform or seat
and a soap dish in the "Homart" bathtub," the Commission held
the requisite similarity in grade or quality lacking, and dismissed
the complaint. The other decision, The Quaker Oats Co.,o in-
volved the sale of Quaker's "run 14" oat flour to the Gerber
Products Company at prices below those charged to other buyers
for other runs of flour. "Run 14" differed from other runs in that
it contained a higher hull content, although the costs of pro-
duction were the same as for other runs. The hearing examiner
found that since the flour was not intended for sale to ultimate
consumers, and because Quaker manufactured all of its runs of
oat flour to suit the specifications of each particular buyer, the
physical variations would not prevent satisfaction of the "like
grade and quality" requirement." In reversing the hearing ex-
aminer, the FTC cited Universal-Rundle and held that "if there
are substantial physical differences in products which affect con-
sumer preference or marketability, such products are not of like
grade and quality, regardless of whether manufacturing costs
are the same. . . ."52
B. RECOGNITION OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES AMONG OTHER-
WISE IDENTICAL PRODUCTS
The sale of identical products under different brand names
is a common business practice." When the presence of a particu-
lar label creates a consumer preference for a product because of
the good will enjoyed by the manufacturer or seller, sellers com-
monly obtain a higher retail price for the product. Thus it may
be contended that the products are not of "like grade and
quality." While the courts and the FTC are agreed that different
labels which do not affect consumer preference will not operate
49. TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1963-1965 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 16948, at 22004.
50. TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1963-1965 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 17134 (Nov. 25, 1964).
51. TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1963-1965 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 16629 (1963).
52. TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1963-1965 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 17134, at 22214 (Nov. 25, 1964) (Elman, Commissioner).
53. See EDwARDs, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAw 31 (1959).
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to oust the operation of the Robinson-Patman Act," the treat-
ment of branding which does affect consumer preference has re-
ceived recent reappraisal. In 1986 the FTC held in Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.," that the original Clayton Act provision
was applicable where the respondent, in addition to selling a
"regular" tire line under its own label, sold physically identical
tires to Sears-Roebuck and Company for resale under a different
brand name, even though it was clear that the Goodyear-branded
tire commanded a much higher price on the retail market." In
1964, the Fifth Circuit reversed, in Borden Co. v. FTC,5 7 an FTC
decision" which, like Goodyear, had held that physically identical
products which had attained considerably different degrees of
consumer acceptance because of the presence of different labels
were of "like grade and quality." Because of the high degree of
good will attached to its brand name, Borden's evaporated milk
sold at a premium retail price. The company also sold the
identical product, at considerably lower prices, to retailers who
marketed it under their own labels. The court held that attaching
different labels to identical products will not in itself dispel the
existence of "like grade and quality." However, where the brand
name on one carries with it "demonstrable commercial signifi-
cance"" the branded product would be differentiated so as to oust
the operation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Although the court
attempted to harmonize its decision with Goodyear, it seems
clear that the latter was effectively overruled.0o
To summarize, the courts and the FTC have established
general guidelines for determining whether commodities are of
"like grade and quality" under section 2(a). Borden, Universal-
54. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964); Hartley
& Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962);
Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938). See note 7 supra.
55. 22 F.T.C. 239 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 101 F.2d 620 (6th
Cir. 1939); see U.S. Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950); U.S. Rubber Co., 28
F.T.C. 1489 (1939). In none of these cases was the issue of "like grade and
quality" seriously contested by the respondent.
56. 22 F.T.C. at 295.
57. 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
58. The Borden Co., TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1961-1963 F.T.C.
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 16191 (1962).
59. 339 F.2d at 137.
60. The FTC has asked the Solicitor General to seek review of the
Borden decision in the Supreme Court. Representative Joe L. Evins, Chair-
man of the House Small Business Committee has stated that there is "little
doubt regarding the severe impact that the appellate court decision is ex-
pected to exert on small business problems . . . ." Trade Regulation Reports,
No. 186, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 4, in TRADE REG. REP.
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Rundle, and Quaker Oats, in particular, indicate that physical
differences and brand differences which affect consumer prefer-
ences or marketability preclude the existence of "like grade and
quality," while brand differences which do not affect consumer
preferences do not preclude its existence.e'
I. TOWARD AN INTERPRETATION OF "LIKE GRADE
AND QUALITY" CONSISTENT WITH THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT
A. INTRoDUCTIoN
If its objectives were to be carried out to their logical extreme,
the Robinson-Patman Act would require that pricing conform to
relative cost data to eliminate primary line price discrimination
and to consumer preference data to eliminate secondary line
discrimination. Such an approach seems impracticable, however,
since a seller must contend with the possibility of both appli-
cations of the act in formulating his pricing policies. Moreover,
the fullest application of the objectives of the act in primary
line cases would require that all of a firm's products be priced
on the basis of their relative costs. Such an approach would be
impossible from an administrative standpoint, would conflict
with general antitrust policy" and would altogether ignore the
limiting phrase "like grade and quality." On the other hand,
application of the act so as to effectuate its purposes in all
situations where the possibility of secondary line injury is present
seems feasible and can be accomplished without indulging in un-
reasonable statutory construction.
61. The unexplored question of whether physical differences which are
unreflected by consumer preference will oust the operation of the act is
probably of limited importance, since a seller seldom markets two physically
different products which compete with one another and which sell for
exactly the same price. However, this might occur where physically different
products are sold for reincorporation into end products which consumers
do not differentiate. The language quoted from the Quaker Oats opinion
in the text accompanying note 52 supra would seem to indicate that physical
differences unaccompanied by an effect on comparative consumer accepta-
bility would be disregarded for "like grade and quality" purposes. This may
explain the result in Bruce's Juices. See note 45 supra and accompanying
text. If this is the case, however, Quaker Oats was wrongly decided under
its own standard since "run 14" flour was ultimately incorporated in a
product indistinguishable to consumers from products produced from the
other runs of flour.
62. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
349 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); ATT'y GEN.
NAT'L Coumr. ANTrrausT REP. 383-36 (1955).
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B. Tmcsis
As noted above, the "like grade and quality" clause of the
Robinson-Patman Act has been construed as excluding from the
jurisdiction of the act the price relationship between those
products as to which varying levels of consumer acceptability
exist due to differences in brand name, design, or physical charac-
teristics. As a result the act is inapplicable to many situations
where competition exists in the presence of some product dif-
ferentiation. To the extent that this happens and sellers are
consequently permitted to establish price differentials in excess
of differences in consumer demand, realization of the secondary
line objectives of the act is obstructed.
The narrow construction of "like grade and quality," and
the limited appreciation of the scope of competition among
differentiated products which it reflects, represent a departure
from other areas of trade regulation law where it has consistently
been recognized that competition may exist among products
which differ in brand name, design, or physical characteristics.
For example, the McGuire Act permits commodities to be fair
traded if they are in "free and open competition with commodi-
ties of the same general class produced or distributed by others
.. . ."" Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that in determining
whether a monopoly exists in the production of cellophane in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, all flexible packaging
material with which the demand for cellophane is reasonably
cross-elastic must be considered as being within the same "rele-
vant market."6 4 Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in a recent
decision construing section 7 of the Clayton Act that there is
sufficient competition between glass jars and metal cans for a
merger between producers of each to come within that act's
proscription of any acquisition whose effect may be substantially
to lessen competition in a "line of commerce.""
It is submitted that rather than requiring complete product
identity, the application of a more liberal test would better
comply with the act's secondary line objectives. It should be
63. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964) (Emphasis added.); see
Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 828 (1947); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Util. Co., 138 F. Supp. 670,
674 (D. Md. 1956); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Economy Saes Co., 127
F. Supp. 739, 742 (D. Conn. 1954).
64. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956).
65. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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recognized that cross-elasticity and functional interchangeability
may produce meaningful competition notwithstanding varying
levels of consumer appeal." Thus, differences in consumer prefer-
ence would not be considered in determining whether the juris-
dictional requirements of the act had been met. Commodities
which are intended for similar uses and compete with each other,
but which command different retail prices because of brand or
physical differences would be included within the jurisdiction of
section 2(a).
In Universal-Rundle,7 the FTC recognized that physical
differences can affect "consumer preference or marketability,"
but held as a result that the two products in question were not
of "like grade and quality" so that the Robinson-Patman Act was
unavailable to limit the price differential between them. The
Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in the Borden case, where
consumer preference arose from a difference in brand name be-
tween two physically-identical products. It would seem that in
both cases the significance of consumer preference for one of two
similar products was misconstrued. The differentiation upon
which such preference is based, whether involving physical
characteristics or brands, creates separate markets for products
in most cases only when the resulting price differential does not
exceed the difference in value in the minds of consumers." For
example, competition between the "Big Three" tobacco com-
panies and the cut-rate manufacturers in the sale of cigarettes
was found in American Tobacco Co. v. United Stateso to attain
stability only when the cut-rate cigarettes were sold for about
four cents below the price of the premium cigarettes. If the
price differential reached five cents, the percentage of the market
enjoyed by the cheaper product would steadily increase, while a
66. See Cassady & Grether, supra note 35, at 277-78, which seems to
indicate that such a standard would be desirable. Rowe, Price Differentials
and Product Differentiation* The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
66 YAi L.J. 1, 45 (1956), suggests a test of "fungibility," but would limit
its application to physically different products having differences which do
not affect consumer preferences. A test of cross-elasticity under the Robin-
son-Patman Act was specifically rejected in Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC,
258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
67. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
68. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 Fd 188 (5th Cir. 1964).
69. Of. Judge Learned Hand's discussion of competition between "virgin"
and "secondary" aluminum in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.ed 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945). For discussion of the competition be-
tween differentiated products, see Note, 54 COLum. L. REv. 580, 589 (1954).
70. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 806-08 (1946).
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difference of three cents enabled the "Big Three" to control al-
most the entire market. 1
Thus, the "like grade or quality" decisions exaggerate the
importance of relatively slight product differences in holding
that a consumer preference will completely preclude operation
of the act. The consequence of these holdings is to deprive a
retailer who buys a premium product of protection from sales
of nonpremium products by his distributor to his competitors
at discounts which far exceed the value of the consumer prefer-
ence for the premium product. For example, X sells a product
which commands a one dollar premium over the price which
Y receives in the sale of his nonpremium product. It seems
clear that sales by a distributor who supplies both X and Y will
be economically discriminatory if Y is able to buy the non-
premium product for two dollars less than X pays for the premi-
um product." The result of such sales will be just as destructive
to X's profit margin as would a differential of one dollar in the
wholesale prices paid by X and Y for products between which
no consumer preference exists.
An approach to product differentiation has been taken in
other contexts under the Robinson-Patman Act which seems
to be at odds with that used recently in interpreting "like grade
and quality." In these situations it appears to have been
recognized that the competition which the Robinson-Patman
Act is designed to protect includes competition between sellers
of products which are differentiated because of physical charac-
teristics or brand names. For example, it has been held that the
competitive injury which must be shown in order to apply the
act may take the form in a primary line case of harm to another
seller whose products are not identical with those of the de-
fendant with respect to physical characteristics or other con-
stituents of relative consumer appeal."3 Moreover, in Liggett
71. In United States v. Continental Can Co., 878 U.S. 441, 454-55
(1964), decided under § 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court stressed the im-
portance of relative pricing of differentiated products in stating that "manu-
facturers in each industry [glass jars and metal cans] take into consideration
the price of the containers of the opposing industry in formulating their
own pricing policy."
72. See Note, 54 CoLum. L. REV. 580, 589-90 (1954).
78. See E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944). See
also ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRusT REP. 157 n.100 (1955): "It is, of
course, clear that the 'like grade and quality' concept is relevant solely to
compare two or more items sold by one seller to his several customers, and
not to measure the similarity of his goods with those of a competitor." See
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& Myers Tobacco Co.," a secondary line case, the FTC found
sufficient competition between cigarettes sold in vending ma-
chines and those sold over-the-counter to sustain a finding of
injury to competition even though the different methods of
sale differentiated the products at the consumer level. Similarly
in Thompson Products, Ino.," the Commission found injury
to competition between buyers of automobile parts which the
seller marketed under different brand names, one of which was
preferred by consumers. Further, in applying the provision in
section 2(b) of the act for justifying a price differential on the
ground that it is necessary to meet competition, not only have
the courts realistically treated premium and nonpremium prod-
ucts as competing within the same market, but they have also
recognized the significance of consumer preference by refusing
to permit the premium seller to reduce his price below the point
at which the difference between it and the price of the non-
premium product reflects consumer preference." Thus the type
of competition which the present interpretation of "like grade
also McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D.
Mo. 1948). But cf. Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 41 F. Supp. 436
(N.D. Ill. 1941).
74. 56 F.T.C. 221 (1959).
75. 55 F.T.C. 1252 (1959).
76. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd on other grounds,
265 Fad 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), reversal upheld on
other grounds, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regu-
lator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd on other grounds 191 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 844 U.S. 206 (1952). While the Borden court
felt that this analogy supported its position on the meaning of "like grade
and quality," 339 F.2d at 138-39, its reliance seems misplaced. The rationale
of the § 2(b) premium products cases that selling a premium product at the
same price as a nonprenium product undercuts the latter in price assumes
a basically competitive relationship between the two and the necessity of
maintaining the price spread attributable to the consumer differentiation.
This is thus contrary to the view, implicit in the Borden decision, that dif-
ferentiated products are not comparable for price regulation purposes. The
restriction on the use of § 2(b) by premium sellers is designed to determine
a permissible range within which a price may be lowered rather than to
make the defense wholly inapplicable. RoWE, PcFCE DISCRMINATION UNDER
THE RouNsoN-PARAN AcT 242-45 (1962).
The Borden court's apparent misunderstanding of the treatment accorded
premium products under § 2(b) may be due in part to its reliance on a
seemingly erroneous FTC decision which read a "like grade and quality"
requirement into the § 2(b) defense. See Bigelow Sandford Carpet Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipula-
tions) 16800 (1964). It is clear that the "like grade and quality" clause
is wholly inapplicable to § 2(b). See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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and quality" seems to exempt from the regulation of the act is
identical to that which has been expressly recognized by the
courts and the FTC as coming within the scope of other regu-
latory provisions of the act.
Consumer preferences should be taken into account only to
the extent necessary to permit price differentials to reflect dif-
ferences in value of the products upon resale. Under such a test
preference would be considered in relation to the "injury to com-
petition" requirement, rather than in determining whether the
products are of "like grade and quality." Thus, where two prod-
ucts otherwise meet the requirements of "like grade and quality,"
but one of them, because of physical characteristics or brand
name, commands a premium retail price, a lower wholesale
price for the nonpremium product would be considered injurious
to competition only to the extent that it affords an advantage
over the premium product in the retail market.7 7 Since the resale
value "spread" between the two products will probably vary
from time to time and place to place, the precise extent of the
permissible wholesale differentiation may not be ascertainable;
nevertheless determination of the general retail price spread will
afford a basis for requiring a pricing policy which is basically
fair to competing purchasers in light of available information.
Where a consumer preference exists among products because
of a physical difference or the attraction of a brand name, but
the products are still competitive within a standard of cross-
elasticity or interchangeability, the seller should, of course, be
permitted to rely upon statutory cost justification in setting
differential prices as an alternative to showing consumer prefer-
77. In Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITUST REP. 159 (1955) it is pro-
posed that "whenever a seller's price differentials to intermediate distributors
. . . reflect no more than the spread between the prices the public will pay
. . . no 'injury' to competition should reasonably be found." See also
Cassady & Grether, note 35 supra, at 275, 278 n.89. Rowe considers the
proposal but concludes that it is inadequate to protect the manufacturer's
interest in his good will with respect to possible applications of the Robinson-
Patman Act's proscriptions of discriminatory services or advertising pay-
ments. In such cases no competitive injury need be shown. Rowe, Price
Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 41 (1956). It is difficult to understand how
this reasoning has any bearing upon the propriety of using the "injury to
competition" approach in § 2(a) cases.
The defendant in Borden argued that the retail value of the brand name
:should be subtracted in determining the price for purposes of ascertaining
the existence of discrimination, but the Commission rejected this argument.
'TRADE REG. RuEP. (11th ed.) (1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipula-
ttions) 16191, at 21019 (1962).
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ence when his cost justification exceeds the consumer prefer-
ence.78
The approach for treating consumer preferences among simi-
lar competitive products which is outlined above seems prefer-
able to either of the two possible alternatives. Complete disregard
of consumer preferences, as under Goodyear, requires pricing
policies which do not conform to the realities of product dif-
ferentiation.79 On the other hand, the Borden-Universal-Run-
dle-Quaker Oats approach, which views the existence of a
consumer preference as negating the existence of "like grade and
quality," permits price differentiation far in excess of that
justified by the preference, and therefore withholds the pro-
tection of the Robinson-Patman Act from buyers competing in
the resale of differentiated products.8 o
While the injury to competition approach to the problems
raised by product differentiation would require a standard which,
as to differentiated products, would be based upon maintaining
price ratios rather than price identity, this would not be a radical
78. The Arz'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTIrusT REP. 159 (1955) suggests
that justification based upon the higher promotional and advertising costs
involved in the sale of "premium" products should be possible. See also C. E.
Neihoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114 (1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957),
judgment vacated on other grounds, 855 U.S. 411 (1958); RowE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROBINsoN-PATMAN AcT 298 (1962). In Borden
the FTC indicated that this would be possible but rejected the proferred
cost data on other grounds. TRADE REG. REP. (11th ed.) (1961-1963 FTC
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 16191, at 21028-25.
79. The proposed test would not be altogether inconsistent with the
Goodyear approach, since "like grade and quality" was virtually conceded
by the respondent in that case, 22 F.T.C. at 290. The Commission predicated
its finding of injury to competition largely upon statistics indicating that
the discrimination in price far exceeded the price increment commanded by
the premium products. 22 F.T.C. at 804-13. However, the injunction granted
by the Commission would appear to have required pricing which would not
permit sale of the favored product at a price reflecting the consumer prefer-
ence. 22 F.T.C. at 333-34.
80. Once consumer preferences have been recognized as a ground for
permitting price differentials between the preferred and nonpreferred prod-
ucts, it might be argued that a seller should be required to maintain a dif-
ferential equal to the consumer preference. If the price differential is less
than the amount of the consumer preference the buyer for resale of the
cheaper product would suffer in competition. However, requiring main-
tenance of the price differential would be of dubious social value, since it
would encourage practices which induce irrational consumer buying. The
approach suggested in this Note would recognize as an economic reality
the existence of subjective product differentiation and permit pricing in
accordance with it without requiring such pricing or preventing price move-
ments which would tend -to eliminate it.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1176
departure from Robinson-Patman Act dogma. The act prohibits
only price discrimination which may substantially injure com-
petition; it does not prohibit price differentials."' Moreover, a
proportional approach was employed in one case where it was
held that a seller who sold at different prices in different areas,
presumably without violating the act, must accompany a price
reduction in one area with a proportional reduction in the other. 2
It may be thought that this approach imposes an excessively
heavy burden upon the seller to determine whether products the
consumer appeal of which is differentiated in various ways would
come within the jurisdictional requirement of "like grade and
quality" and, if so, the amount of the price spread justified
by this differentiation. However, the problems suggested by this
objection would only be encountered by a seller who markets
two similar and highly competitive products differentiated by
brand or physical characteristics and who has chosen to make
the cheaper product available solely to his favored customers. 3
The basic tenet of the Robinson-Patman Act is that a seller
should not accord favored treatment to one particular buyer or
group of buyers.8 4 Therefore, a seller who makes different but
similar products available to different customers is not unreason-
ably burdened if he has an obligation to insure that he does not
thereby injure competition among them. It would be naive to
suppose that a seller who handles products which are substantially
similar in appearance and function does not realize that these
products are in competition inter se, or that a seller who creates
81. Section 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
82. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 304 (1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), reversal
upheld on other grounds, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
83. A seller who markets two or more products or lines differentiated
by brand or physical characteristics can avoid the labeling of the practice
as "discriminatory" by making all the products or lines available to all
purchasers. Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 829 F.2d 694, 703-04 (9th
Cir. 1964); Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 807 F.2d 916,
922-23 (5th Cir. 1962); Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 Fad 768,
770 (8th Cir. 1934). Cassady & Grether, supra note 35, at 270 n.65, suggest
that the sale of the cheaper commodity may constitute a service or payment
in violation of § 2(d) or § 2(e). Of. Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940). Under
this rationale a seller could not rely on that proviso of the act which gives
him the right to select his own customers in refusing to sell the cheaper
product to some of his customers. On refusals to deal under the proviso
generally, see Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, 218 F.ed 202 (10th Cir.
1954).
84. See Rahl, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 185,
187 (1955).
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a special product or brand for a chain store does not realize that
such products are meant to be sold in competition with his higher
priced regular products." It might also be objected that it would
be an impossible task to prove the cosumer preference in justi-
fying price differences, but this objection seems adequately met
by the fact that such consumer preferences must be proved at
present for other purposes under the Robinson-Patman Act.3
CONCLUSION
The present interpretation of "like grade and quality" under
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act unduly hampers the
act's effectiveness in preventing price discrimination which in-
jures competition at the secondary line. Since products are often
competitive notwithstanding differences in consumer appeal, the
present requirements of physical and brand-name identity to
invoke the jurisdiction of the act are artificial. The economics
of cross-elasticity and functional interchangeability - products
of the theory of monopolistic competition - require the adoption
of an expanded and more sophisticated interpretation of the
clause. Other areas of antitrust law have recognized these con-
cepts, and they could reasonably be encompassed by "like grade
85. Moreover, even though a price differential is not justifiable by
consumer preference, the seller might invoke cost justification. See note 78
s.upra and accompanying text. While the objection might be raised that
judicial history has proved cost justification to be a very difficult matter
for a seller to prove, a close examination indicates that most of the diffi-
culties involved are peculiar to attempts to justify different prices on the
basis of different selling costs as between different groupings of customers,
and would have little or no applicability to cost justification on the basis
of different manufacturing costs involved in the production of different
products. The FTC has recognized the ease of computing production costs
as compared with distribution costs. FTC, CASE STUDIES IN DISTRIBUTING
COST AcCOUNTING FOR MANUFACTURING AND WHOrEsALING 28-30 (1941).
See generally EDwARDs, THE PRIFC DIscRnMNATIoN LAw 589-97 (1959). A
basic problem in regard to justification on the basis of different costs in
selling to different customers is showing that all buyers within one cost-
grouping are homogeneous, i.e., that the particular data utilized in allocating
costs to a group is applicable to all members of the group. See United
States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962). Such a problem would not be
faced by a seller who attempted to justify differentials on the basis of dif-
fering manufacturing costs, since all items of cost in this case would be
applicable to all units of the particular product.
86. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. See also The Pure Oil Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) (1959-1960 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipula-
tions) 2 7791 (1959), where the essence of the discrimination was the sale
at different prices which lessened the "margin" of Pure's price over that
of the nonpremium brands.
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and quality," since nothing in that clause inexorably requires
absolute identity. A pricing standard reflective of differences in
consumer preferences possessed by various products could be
achieved through the more flexible test of injury to competition.
Under such a scheme products competitive at the consumer level
would be deemed to be of "like grade and quality." However, the
seller could maintain a differential to the extent of any consumer
preference, since the resulting equality of his buyers' cost-price
margins would prevent any injury to competition.
